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Summary
The reported prevalence of vancomycin-resistant Entero-
coccus faecium (VRE) in Switzerland for the years
2008–2010 has been low at <5%. At the University Hos-
pital Zurich, 17 cases of VRE were detected between 28
December 2009 and 15 February 2010. Nine cases were
diagnosed clinically; eight cases were detected by rectal
screening. The centre of the outbreak was the cardiac sur-
gery department. Four patients suffered from VRE-infec-
tions; four patients died.
In order to investigate and contain the outbreak, the follow-
ing measures were taken: prevalence surveys using weekly
rectal screening, environmental screening; selective enrich-
ment culturing; pulsed field gel electrophoresis (PFGE)
for clonal typing and polymerase chain reaction-analysis
(PCR) for resistance determinants and virulence factors de-
tection. Contact isolation in single rooms and enhanced
surface-disinfection methods were implemented. Ward
nurses were assigned as link nurses. Regular teaching was
carried out aiming to improve hand disinfection among
healthcare workers.
PFGE revealed two main pulsotypes each including seven
patients. Five minor pulsotypes originated from three addi-
tional patients and one sample collected from a keyboard.
Two of three patients with minor pulsotypes had been
treated abroad. PCR-analysis identified vanB resistance-
genotypes with exception of one vanA resistance-genotype.
The outbreak was associated with environmental contam-
ination and insufficient compliance with hand-hygiene. En-
hanced awareness and infection control measures resulted
in termination of the VRE outbreak within eight weeks.
The complexity of the outbreak with several clones in par-
allel suggests a higher baseline prevalence of VRE in
Switzerland than previous surveillance data indicate.
Key words: vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium
(VRE); outbreak; screening; surveillance
Introduction
Data from Switzerland have shown a sporadic occurrence
of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium (VRE) [1].
Swiss surveillance-data documents a VRE- prevalence of
4.1% among enterococci isolates from hospitalised patients
for the year 2010 (http://www.search.ifik.unibe.ch, ac-
cessed 10 December 2011), The University Hospital Zurich
is an 800-bed tertiary teaching care hospital. Fourteen out
of 831 (1.7%) enterococci isolates in 2010/2011 originating
from clinical samples tested resistant to vancomycin in
the routine microbiological laboratory (outbreak patients
excluded). VRE-prevalence, including carriers, cannot ex-
actly be given for the hospital, because no systematic
screening for VRE carriage is conducted. This finding is
in contrast to surveillance data from the USA. According
to data from the National Nosocomial Infections Surveil-
lance System, more than a quarter of all enterococci con-
tributing to nosocomial infections were resistant to vanco-
mycin by the end of 2004 [2]. VRE-prevalence has been
increasing substantially in some European countries over
the last years reaching 15% in German tertiary care hospit-
als in 2007 [3].
We describe an outbreak of VRE caused by several clonal
strains at a tertiary care hospital in Switzerland with em-
phasis on molecular characteristics and infection control
interventions to combat the outbreak.
Methods
Epidemiological surveillance
After detection of the first two cases of VRE, an epidemi-
ological investigation was started. For this investigation,
the following case definition was used: a) VRE-infection
required the presence of clinical evidence of infection at-
tributed to VRE detected in samples obtained for clinic-
al reasons b) VRE-colonisation was diagnosed if sampling
had been performed in the frame of hospital epidemiology
measures. The investigation included 19 weekly preval-
ence surveys for VRE using rectal screening (total 361
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samples): 11 surveys on a cardiac surgery ward, six con-
ducted in the cardiac surgery intensive care unit, two in the
medical intensive care unit. In addition, we implemented
systematic screening of patients of affected wards before
transfer to another hospital on the cardiac surgery intensive
care unit and the cardiac surgery ward, three environment-
al screenings of fomites (72 samples) and one screening of
health care workers (10 samples). On-site visits by the in-
fection control team took place weekly. Teaching sessions
were held on wards as needed and were used for informal
audits of compliance with infection control measures. For
environmental screening mainly shared ward items were
chosen such as thermometers, blood pressure-cuffs,
computer-keyboards, wheel chairs, an echocardiogram, a
surveillance-tower, a glove-wagon.
Microbiological and molecular diagnostic methods
For microbiological detection and isolation of potential
VRE strains, patient and environmental samples were sub-
jected to enrichment culture in selective broth (Entero-
coccoselTM, BD, Becton Dickinson, Allschwil, Switzer-
land) and subsequent culturing on selective agars (VRE/
CNA, BioMérieux, Geneva, Switzerland). In addition, pa-
tient samples were inoculated onto colistin-nalidixic acid
containing agars. Screening cultures for vancomycin res-
istance were initially performed as stated in the CLSI
guidelines [4], using disk diffusion agars containing 30 µg/
ml vancomycin. Because two of eight cases (25%) were
still negative at 24 hours incubation we prolonged the in-
cubation time to 48 hours. For isolates identified as poten-
tial VRE by screening, the minimal inhibitory concentra-
tion of teicoplanin and vancomycin (E-test, BioMérieux)
was determined. Polymerase chain reaction analysis (PCR)
for presence of vanA and vanB vancomycin-resistance de-
terminants and hyl and esp virulence factors was carried out
according to established methods [5]. PFGE-analyses were
carried out with SmaI digests of chromosomal DNA isol-
ated from representative subtypes of the epidemic VRE-
isolates as previously described [6].
Infection control measures
Contact isolation of affected patients in single rooms and
daily surface-disinfection of patient rooms using aldehyde
containing products (Kohrsolin® FF, Bode) were imple-
mented. Rooms were also disinfected after patient dis-
charge. Ward nurses were assigned to function as link
nurses for infection control. Regular teaching of nurses and
physicians including feedback on the status of the outbreak
and the results of the screenings was carried out with the
aim to improve compliance with and quality of hand disin-
fection among healthcare workers.
Results
With onset in December 2009, a series of patients with
VRE was observed. After detection of three cases, active
contact tracing and regular screening were implemented
and resulted in the detection of 17 cases of VRE carrying
patients between 28 December 2009 and 15 February 2010
(table 1). The cardiac surgery department involved 13 pa-
tients on one ward and in the intensive care unit. During
their stay in the hospital, cardiac surgery patients are
routinely transferred between ward, operating room, in-
tensive care unit and finally ward again. Of the remaining
four patients, one had been admitted to a medical ward, one
to the medical intensive care unit and two to a visceral sur-
gery ward. The clinical characteristics of the patients are
shown in table 1. Nine cases were diagnosed clinically by
routine antibiotic susceptibility testing, while eight cases
were detected by rectal screening.
The median duration of hospitalisation until VRE-detection
was 23 days (range 8–71 days); the median total duration
of hospitalisation was 38 days (range 10–142 days). Four
patients (24%) suffered from manifest infections. Four pa-
tients (24%) died. Two of them had manifest infections
(table 1). However, three deaths could not directly be at-
tributed to an infection with VRE, but one death was the
consequence of a complicated sternal wound infection by
VRE. Antibiotic treatment options were limited. All VRE
strains tested resistant to ampicillin. One of the patients
with manifest infection was treated initially with teicoplan-
in and subsequently linezolide; a second patient was treated
with teicoplanin and gentamicin. The third and fourth pa-
tient did not receive antibiotic treatment with respect to a
palliative situation and transfer out, respectively. Causes
of death were multiorgan dysfunction syndrome (MODS),
acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), haemorrhagic
shock and pneumonia.
Enterococcus spp. were detected from nine environmental
samples on wards affected by the outbreak, namely from an
echocardiogram machine, a cardiac defibrillator, a wheel-
chair, a surveillance-tower, a thermometer, a computer-
keyboard, two glove-wagons, and one infusion set. One pa-
tient colonised with VRE was the index case for another
outbreak comprising four patients in a tertiary care hospital
of a neighbouring region after being transferred from our
hospital.
Pulsed field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) revealed two main
pulsotypes. One pulsotype included seven patients and a
defibrillator (pattern A); the second (pattern B) included
seven patients. Three of four patients of the outbreak in the
hospital mentioned above had pattern A; one sample was
not typeable. In addition, five minor pulsotypes (patterns
C, D, E, F and G) were identified that affected three addi-
tional patients (one with two different pulsotypes: patterns
C and D), and one environmental sample collected from a
keyboard (pattern G). Two out of three patients with minor
pulsotypes had been treated in foreign health care sys-
tems (Bolivia and Turkey). The patient from Bolivia had
Figure 1
Agarose gel electrophoresis analysis of vanA and vanB PCR
screening of VRE isolates. Amplicon sizes: vanA: 377 bp (lane 18);
vanB: 298 bp (lanes 1–17, 19, 20). Lanes 1–18: VRE isolates from
patient samples (patients 1–17, lanes 4 and 5 are both isolates
from patient 4); lanes 19–20: VRE isolates from environmental
samples (keyboard and defibrillator); lane –: negative control; lane
+: vanA and vanB positive control. Lane M: size marker.
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a single PFGE-pattern (pattern F); the patient from Turkey
had two distinct PFGE-patterns (patterns C and D, table1).
VRE-screening PCR-analysis and corresponding resistance
phenotypes identified vanB type resistance in most cases
with exception of the isolate from Bolivia, which had a
vanA resistance genotype and phenotype (fig. 1, lane 18)
and one isolate in which neither vanA nor vanB was detec-
ted (fig. 1, lane 4). Presumably the vanA and vanB negat-
ive isolate carries a less frequently occurring van resistance
locus [3].
Susceptibility to teicoplanin was used to differentiate vanB
and vanA phenotypes. MICs for teicoplanin ranged from
0.5 to 3 µg/ml for vanB strains, whereas MICs of vanco-
mycin in vanB carrying strains ranged from 24 to >256 µg/
ml. The vanA strain had a MIC for teicoplanin of 24 µg/ml
and a MIC for vancomycin of >256 µg/ml. 15/17 patients
(88%) were positive for the pathogenicity marker esp; 6/17
patients (35%) were positive for the virulence factor hyl.
Esp and hyl were not strictly linked to specific pulsotypes.
The need for contact isolation of all VRE patients resulted
in severe bed shortages on the affected ward and com-
promised the capacity of the cardiac surgery division to
admit patients for elective surgery. Frequent visits of the
infection control team were necessary to ensure strict en-
forcement of infection control measures (e.g., conduction
and documentation of the weekly prevalence screening;
active environmental screening and feedback of results to
health care workers on the affected ward). As a conse-
quence of the satellite outbreak in a hospital of a neigh-
bouring region, we made sure that every patient of the
cardiac surgery department was screened for VRE shortly
before transfer to another hospital. Several teaching ses-
sions resulted in increased awareness of physicians, nurses
and physiotherapists regarding the necessary measures to
prevent further VRE transmission. During the first weeks
of the outbreak the infection control team had to be present
on the ward almost daily, whereas towards the end nurses
(facilitated by the link nurse) and physicians addressed
questions and demands more actively. The outbreak was
considered successfully controlled after weekly screenings
of patients over a period of 5 weeks failed to detect new
cases.
Table 1: Demographic, clinical and epidemiological data of affected patients.
Pa-
tient
Sex Age Hospital
ward
Date of
onset
Case
detec-
tion*
Underlying
disease
Preceding
surgery
Clinical
presen-
tation**
Type of
Infection
Hospita-
lisation until
VRE-detection
(days)
Hospita-
lisation
(total
days)
Outcome PFGE-
pattern
Genotype
1 M 74 Cardiac
surgery
28.12.09 C Myocardial
infarction
Coronary artery
bypass graft
I Retrosternal
abscess
22 59 Discharge A vanB/
esp+/hyl-
2 M 58 Cardiac
surgery
04.01.10 C Cardiomyopathy Heart
transplantation
C 71 142 Discharge A vanB/
esp+/hyl-
3 M 43 Medical
intensive
care
11.01.10 C Influenza
H1N1-ARDS
Extracorporeal
membrane-
oxygenation
C 34 104 Death B vanB/
esp+/hyl-
4 M 71 Cardiac
surgery
11.01.10 C A iliaca-
aneurysm
Graft-implantation C 37 65 Discharge C, D vanB/
esp+/hyl-/
hyl+
5 M 45 Visceral
surgery
11.01.10 C Ileum-
perforation
Ileostoma-
reimplantation
C 8 87 Discharge B vanB/
esp+/hyl+
6 M 79 Cardiac
surgery
11.01.10 S Myocardial
infarction
Coronary artery
bypass graft
C 23 23 Discharge B vanB/
esp+/hyl-
7 F 62 Cardiac
surgery
18.01.10 S Valvular
cardiopathy
Valve-
reconstruction
C 35 38 Discharge A vanB/
esp+/hyl+
8 F 39 Cardiac
surgery
18.01.10 S Deep venous
thrombosis
Loop atrio-
ventricular-shunt
C 11 13 Discharge B vanB/
esp+/hyl-
9 M 35 Cardiac
surgery
25.01.10 S Valvular
cardiopathy
Valve-
reconstruction
C 10 10 Discharge B vanB/esp-
/hyl-
10 F 83 Cardiac
surgery
25.01.10 C Aortal
dissection
Supracoronary
graft
I Bacteraemia 23 10 Discharge A vanB/
esp+/hyl+
11 M 72 Cardiac
surgery
01.02.10 S Valvular
cardiopathy
Valve-
reconstruction
C 12 14 Discharge B vanB/esp-
/hyl-
12 M 65 Cardiac
surgery
08.02.10 S Valvular
cardiopathy
Valve-
reconstruction
C 12 12 Discharge A vanB/
esp+/hyl+
13 M 82 Cardiac
surgery
08.02.10 S Valvular
cardiopathy
Valve-
reconstruction
C 34 34 Discharge A vanB/
esp+/hyl-
14 M 48 Visceral
surgery
15.02.10 C Colon-
carcinoma
Colectomy I Bacteraemia 63 63 Death E vanB/
esp+/hyl-
15 M 81 Cardiac
surgery
15.02.10 C Aortal
dissection
Sternal revision I Sternal
wound
infection
8 55 Death A vanB/
esp+/hyl-
16 M 57 Cardiac
surgery
15.02.10 S Coronar
cardiopathy
Coronary artery
bypass graft
C 11 32 Death B vanB/
esp+/hyl-
17 M 58 Medical
ward
28.12.09 C Endocarditis Valve-
reconstruction
C 24 65 Discharge F vanA/
esp+/hyl+
*C = case detection on clinical indication, S = case detection by screening
** C = colonisation, I = infection
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Discussion
We describe the characteristics and control of the first pub-
lished VRE-outbreak in Switzerland. The cardiac surgery
department of our hospital was the outbreak’s centre ren-
dering this the first published report with focus on cardiac
surgery. The outbreak involved seven VRE clonal strains
within a short time period of 14 days, illustrating the com-
plexity of VRE-epidemiology in a single hospital.
We isolated 20 VRE strains from 17 patients (one patient
with two different VREs) and two environmental sources.
Two main VRE clonal strains affected 12 patients on car-
diac surgery (pattern A, seven patients, pattern B, five pa-
tients), one patient on the medical intensive care unit and
one patient on visceral surgery. Of five additional, un-
matched clonal strains, three were likely to have been im-
ported by two patients who were hospitalised abroad, one
was a single isolate detected on a defibrillator and another
genetically unrelated isolate was cultured from a patient on
a visceral surgery ward who had never been in contact with
cardiac surgery. These five single, unmatched PFGE-pat-
terns suggest the presence of imported and local sporadic
VRE-strains. In the local sporadic cases, plasmid mediated
transfer of the vanB resistance cassette potentially caused
the appearance of an additional pulsotype. Initially an out-
break strain may have transferred its resistance-plasmid to
vancomycin-sensitive enterococci in the intestines of col-
onised patients [7]. In spite of several strains, the pres-
ence of two major pulsotypes indicates substantial hori-
zontal transmission suggestive of two outbreaks within this
multiple-strain outbreak. The presence of different pulso-
types in parallel has been previously reported [8].
All four patients with manifest infections due to VRE were
esp positive, a result that supports the described association
between the presence of esp and the invasiveness of VRE
[8]. An association between manifest infection and the
presence of the hyl-gene was not found in our study.
This VRE outbreak affected the department of cardiac sur-
gery. In this department, transfer of patients to and from
cardiac surgery, insufficient compliance with hand hygiene
of staff and subsequent environmental contamination may
have facilitated transmission of initially sporadic vanB car-
rying strains. All patients had undergone surgery (all but
two cardiac surgery), which has been described to be a risk
factor for VRE-acquisition [9]. The long median duration
of hospitalisation prior to detection of VRE reflects the
complex, composite morbidities of affected patients. Pro-
longed hospitalisation is a known risk-factor for VRE ac-
quisition [10]. Eight of 17 patients (47%) received vanco-
mycin during their hospital stay, which could have con-
tributed to the selection of VRE [11]. Therefore, the im-
portance of antibiotic stewardship has once more to be
emphasised. Contamination of surfaces of affected wards
was documented by the detection of enterocci in samples
from several sites of the cardiac surgery intensive care unit
and the ward. Environmental contamination is known to
play an important role in transmission of VRE in the in-
tensive care unit [10] and on wards [12]. Enterococci can
survive on dry surfaces for up to 16 weeks [13]. Patients
that are admitted to a room previously occupied by a VRE-
colonised patient have an increased risk of VRE acquisition
[14]. It was reported that healthcare workers have trans-
mitted VRE after hand-contact with contaminated surfaces
without direct contact to a colonised patient [15].
The minimal inhibitory concentration of vanB strains
clusters around the breakpoint according to CLSI
guidelines making detection more difficult than in vanA
carrying strains [16]. A minor error rate of 12% has been
described for vanB strains using disk diffusion [16]. Fur-
thermore, the comparison of two commercially available
selective agars for diagnosis of vanB revealed a sensitivity
in the best performing agar of only 39% at 24 hours [17].
To the best of our knowledge no reports comparing dia-
gnostic sensitivity of the same susceptibility testing method
after 24 and ≥48 hours of incubation time have been pub-
lished to date. If VRE screening during the present out-
break had been performed according to the current CLSI-
guidelines that recommend 24 hours of incubation [4], two
patients with vanB-mediated VRE would have been
missed. Therefore, it was critical to prolong the incubation
time on screening media to 48 hours. Being aware of the
fact that prolonged reporting time could lead to postponing
isolation measures, first reading and reporting of positive
results was done at 24 hours. Because implementation of a
longer incubation time was already started after identifica-
tion of the third case, we were able to minimise problems
in relation to diagnostic sensitivity.
Probably, a combination of several measures was crucial
for containment of the spread of VRE [18]. We started reg-
ular prevalence surveys at an early stage of the outbreak.
Without this intervention we would have missed 48% of
all cases. Those cases missed likely would have contrib-
uted to further propagation of the outbreak as contact isola-
tion would not have been implemented. Regular screening
has been demonstrated to be successful for the control of
an outbreak in France [19]. Because of the important role
of hands in transmission of VRE, teaching of hand hygiene
measures was an essential part of our teaching and inter-
vention activities. Due to transient colonisation of VRE,
there is no evidence for the usefulness of systematic screen-
ing of health care worker's hands [15]. Therefore, only a
few hand-swabs among staff were done for didactic reas-
ons. In our hospital there is no fixed link-nurse system in
place. The appointment of link nurses on affected wards
during this outbreak was an important measure to assure
continuous communication between our infection control
nurses and the cardiac surgery wards. Sufficient staff with
an adequate knowledge and awareness-level is of import-
ance: in a successfully contained outbreak in Western Aus-
tralia, the number of infection control nurses was increased
for this reason [18]. After eight weeks of weekly screen-
ing, no additional cases were detected during continued
weekly screenings for five more weeks and one addition-
al screening three months after the last detected case. The
eight weeks duration of this outbreak was short compared
to the duration of other published VRE-outbreaks, which
lasted four [20], seven [18], 30 [21] or 36 months, respect-
ively [19].
This outbreak does not enable us to infer on national VRE-
epidemiology. But its complexity involving seven clonal
strains could be an indication that also in Switzerland the
incidence of VRE is on the rise. Although Swiss
Original article Swiss Med Wkly. 2012;142:w13540
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surveillance-data show an increase in VRE incidence in
hospitalised patients from 1% in 2007 to 4.1% in 2010
(http://www.search.ifik.unibe.ch, accessed 13 December
2011), the implementation of screening on hospital admis-
sion, which has been propagated by some authors from
high-prevalence countries [22, 23], is at present not justi-
fied at our institution. If screening for VRE is considered,
rapid molecular methods for VRE-detection may be useful
to reduce reporting time. In low prevalence areas as Zurich
molecular methods could be applied to exclude VRE car-
riage as those methods reportedly show high negative pre-
dictive values [24]. However, the positive predictive value
of rapid molecular methods remains low and makes cul-
tural confirmation necessary [25]. This situation parallels
that for MRSA in low prevalence areas. Using rapid PCR
methods to exclude MRSA carriage combined with cultural
confirmation in case of positive PCR results was suggested
[26]. Such a strategy may also be useful to manage VRE
surveillance.
The outbreak was successfully contained in a relatively
short period due to early, consequent infection control
measures, yet intense efforts were necessary to do so.
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Figure1
Agarose gel electrophoresis analysis of vanA and vanB PCR screening of VRE isolates. Amplicon sizes: vanA: 377 bp (lane 18); vanB: 298 bp
(lanes 1–17, 19, 20). Lanes 1–18: VRE isolates from patient samples (patients 1–17, lanes 4 and 5 are both isolates from patient 4); lanes
19–20: VRE isolates from environmental samples (keyboard and defibrillator); lane –: negative control; lane +: vanA and vanB positive control.
Lane M: size marker.
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